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Introduction: Many medical disciplines, such as emergency medicine, trauma surgery,
dermatology, psychiatry, family practice, and dentistry have documented attempts at
assessing the level of bioterrorism preparedness in their communities. Currently, there
is neither such an assessment nor an existing review of potential bioterrorism agents
as they relate to plastic surgery. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to present
plastic surgeons with a review of potential bioterrorism agents. Methods: Ar e v i e wo f
the literature on bioterrorism agents and online resources of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention was conducted. Category A agents were identiﬁed and speciﬁc
attentionwaspaidtothemanagement issuesthatplasticsurgeonsmightfaceintheevent
that these agents are used in an attack. Results: Disease entities reviewed were small-
pox, anthrax, plague, viral hemorrhagic fever, tularemia, and botulism. For each agent,
we presented the microbiology, pathophysiology, clinical presentation, potential for
weaponization, medical management, and surgical issues related to the plastic surgeon.
Conclusion: This article is the ﬁrst attempt at addressing preparedness for bioterrorism
intheplasticsurgerycommunity.Manyotherﬁeldshavealreadystartedasimilarprocess.
This article represents a ﬁrst step in developing evidence-based consensus guidelines
and recommendations for the management of biological terrorism for plastic
surgeons.
The use of biological weapons for bioterrorism is a potential threat faced by many
developed nations. Discerning the nature of the threat as well as an appropriate response
requires awareness of the biological characteristics of these instruments of war. For the
plastic surgeon, the most important means of preparing for a potential bioterrorist attack is
tounderstandthepatternofinjuryofvariouswarfareagentsandtheresultingreconstructive
challenges. As surgical specialists with training in management of burn wounds, and
cutaneous diseases requiring surgical intervention, plastic surgeons should we aware of
the basic presentation and potential management of the most virulent biological warfare
agents.
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HISTORY OF BIOTERRORISM
Bioterrorism involves the intentional use of organisms (ie, bacteria, viruses) or their prod-
ucts, such as toxins to cause death or disease. Such acts cause not only morbidity and
mortality but also lead to social and political disruption. The use of biological agents as
weapons dates back as early as 600 BC when militants used the remains from cadavers
and animal carcasses to cause disease in soldiers of the enemy.1 In the 14th century, the
Tatars catapulted deceased plague victims into the city, causing an epidemic amongst
the inhabitants.2 The subsequent migration of refugees from the defeated city initiated the
plague pandemic, also known as the “Black Death,” which swiftly swept through Europe
and North Africa. In the 18th century, during the ﬁnal battles of the French and Indian war
(1754-1767), Lord Jeffrey Amherst, a commanding general of the British forces, report-
edly distributed blankets that had belonged to smallpox patients with the intent of initiating
outbreaks amongst American Indians. An epidemic ensued, killing more than 50% of the
affected tribes.3
Biological warfare became more sophisticated during the 19th century with the de-
velopment of Koch’s postulates and modern microbiology. Less than a century later, after
World War I, the United Nations ofﬁcially recognized biowarfare as an international threat
in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Despite heightened awareness and international sanctions,
biological weapons continued to play a role in World War II, the Persian Gulf War, and
modern-dayinternationalaffairs.InlightofthesoberingandtragiceventsofSeptember11,
2001, almost a decade ago, the threat of bioterrorism is still real and palpable; preparedness
is our most potent defense.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE 21st CENTURY
It was not until the 2001 anthrax attacks that the United States established national public
healthinitiativestobolstermedicalpreparedness.JustweeksafterSeptember11,astringof
letters sent via US mail to media organizations and political ofﬁces were found to be laced
with Bacillus anthracis spores. A total of 22 people were injured as a result of the mailings;
11 suffered from the inhalational form of the disease, and 5 subsequently died. Thousands
more were indirectly affected, including individuals working in facilities contaminated by
the attacks, and their families. Because anthrax was rarely encountered in medical prac-
tice, few local or federal public health ofﬁcials had experience identifying and evaluating
B. anthracis infection. In addition, this was the ﬁrst time that the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) had been contacted to respond to outbreaks of illness occurring
simultaneously in 5 major cities. This combination of lack of experience, consistency, and
leadership led to medical mismanagement.4
PREPAREDNESS OF THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY
The events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks exposed vulnerability to bioterror-
ism in the medical community.4 Should future attacks occur, clinicians will likely have to
exercise professional judgment in the face of unfamiliar illness, poorly deﬁned protocols,
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uncertain risk factors, and time constraints. Given this challenge, multiple medical dis-
ciplines including emergency medicine, trauma surgery, dermatology, psychiatry, family
practice,dentistry,andnursinghavealldocumentedattemptsatassessingthelevelofbioter-
rorism preparedness in their communities. Currently there is neither such an assessment
nor an existing review of bioterrorism agents as they speciﬁcally relate to plastic surgery.
The aim of this article is to raise awareness among plastic surgeons for such challenges by
exploringthemicrobiology,pathophysiology,presentation,potentialforweaponization,an-
tibiotic use, medical management, vaccination, and surgical issues of speciﬁc high-priority
biological agents.
METHODS
A review of published literature on bioterrorism agents and online resources of the US
CDC was conducted. We identiﬁed category A agents and paid particular attention to the
management issues that plastic surgeons might face for each agent.
RESULTS
Although any microbe could potentially be used as a weapon of bioterrorism, there are
a select number of agents that pose the greatest threat because of their availability and
ease of dissemination. The CDC has developed a classiﬁcation system in which it assigned
each potential agent a category, A through C, based on likelihood of use and risk factors.
Category A agents are classiﬁed as the most effective bioweapons because they are highly
virulent and contagious, require short incubation periods, and are easily produced, handled,
and distributed (Table 1). Pathogens that fall into this category include the following:
anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin), plague (Yersinia
pestis), smallpox (variola major), tularemia (Francisella tularensis),and viral hemorrhagic
fevers (VHFs) (ﬁloviruses/Ebola) (Table 2).
Table 1. Characteristicsofan
effective bioweapon
Highly virulent
Highly contagious
Short incubation period
Susceptibility of target population
Easily dispersed
Easily produced
Easily handled
Smallpox
SmallpoxiscausedbytheDNAvirus,Variolamajora,transmittedviainhalationofdroplets.
Following inoculation, the virus migrates to regional lymph nodes and multiplies. Patients
typically seek medical attention 14 days after infection with complaints of high fevers,
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headaches, prostration, and myalgias. Then a diffuse maculopapular rash appears leaving
pustules that deﬂate and form scabs resulting in areas of exposed dermis and subcutaneous
tissue (Fig 1). Death usually occurs 6 days after the onset of the rash, with an overall
mortality rate of 30% among unvaccinated persons, and a case-fatality rate for conﬂuent
smallpox as high as 62%.5-8
Table 2. Summary table of biological warfare agents
Agent Mortality Potential Plastic Surgery Consultation
Smallpox 30% without pre- or
postexposure
• Lesions may become conﬂuent with resultant skin slough.
Potential for burn-like care and resuscitation
vaccination • Bacterial super-infection of skin may occur
• Vaccine complications include skin necrosis at
inoculation site (ie, Vaccinia necrosum)
Anthrax 20% in the untreated
cutaneous form
• Even with prompt antibiotic therapy, cutaneous lesions
progress through eschar phase
• Debridement relatively contraindicated due to risk of
hematogenous spread and secondary pneumonic anthrax
Plague 50% in the untreated
group
• Erythematous, eroded, crusting, necrotic ulcer at primary
inoculation site
• Incision and drainage of lymphadenopathy (buboes) is
contraindicated due to the risk of hematogenous spread
and subsequent, secondary pneumonic plague
• Respiratory isolation important for healthcare workers to
prevent secondary pneumonic plague
VHF (ie, Ebola) 50%-90% within 1 wk • Mucosal and/or cutaneous ecchymoses common, can be
associated with overlying skin slough
• Rule out acute compartment syndrome with extremity
involvement
Tularemia 80% in untreated • “Heaped-up” ulcer at primary inoculation site
inhalational form • Incision and drainage of lymphadenopathy (“plague-like”
buboes) is contraindicated due to the risk of
hematogenous spread and secondary pneumonic
tularemia
Botulism 60% in the untreated
group
• Terrorist attack likely to be in aerosolized form, causing
inhalational botulism. Requiring respiratory support for
ﬂaccid paralysis
• If wound botulism is suspected as cause of ﬂaccid
paralysis, wide debridement is indicated
VHF indicates viral hemorrhagic fever.
Treatment guidelines
Intheeventthatanoutbreakofsmallpoxwouldoccur,treatmentwouldincludepostexposure
vaccination within 3 days following infection, and supportive care similar to patients with
extensive skin burns.
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Figure 1. Manwithsmallpoxdisplaying thecharacteristicmaculopapu-
lar rash. Source: Public Health Images Library (PHIL) id# 12165.
Anthrax
Anthrax is caused by Bacillus anthracis, a gram-positive, encapsulated, spore-forming
bacillus. It is estimated that 100 kg of powdered B. anthracis could cause 300,000 to
3 million deaths in a densely populated area.9 Infection can occur in 3 forms: inhalational,
gastrointestinal, and cutaneous. Inhalational anthrax initially presents as a mild cold that
progresses to respiratory failure and shock and is usually fatal.10 Gastrointestinal anthrax
follows theconsumptionof contaminatedmeat and ischaracterizedby gastritisand hemop-
tysis. When encountered via the intestinal vector, death results in 25% to 60% of cases.
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Cutaneous anthrax (Fig 2) may also be used as a means of warfare via direct contact of
abraded skin with an inoculum from contaminated wool, hides, leather, or hair products of
infected animals, or incidentally upon exposure from a failed attempt at aerosolization.
Figure 2. Cutaneous anthrax. Source: Public Health Images Library (PHIL) id# 1934.
Treatment guidelines
First-line treatment for endemic cutaneous anthrax includes ciproﬂoxacin (400 mg IV [in-
travenously]twicedaily)ordoxycycline(100mgIVtwicedaily)for10to14days.However,
victims of bioterrorism should be treated for 60 days. Despite prompt administration of
antibiotics, cutaneous lesions may still progress through the eschar phase. Debridement of
the eschar is relatively contraindicated due to the risk of hematogenous spread and sub-
sequent development of secondary pneumonic, gastrointestinal, meningeal, or septicemic
anthrax.11 With appropriate therapy, the morality rate is 1%. An anthrax vaccine has been
developed, but is currently only available to US military personnel.
Bubonic plague
Bubonic plague caused one of the most devastating disease pandemics in history, resulting
in 20 to 30 million deaths in the 14th century. Yersinia pestis, the causative agent, is a
nonmotile, gram-negative bacillus, transmitted to humans by plague-infected ﬂeas carried
on the Norway rat species.12
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Figure 3. This patient presented with symptoms of plague that included gangrene of the right hand
causing necrosis of the ﬁngers. Source: Public Health Images Library (PHIL) id# 4137.
Symptoms begin 2 to 8 days after exposure, when patients start to experience prodro-
mal symptoms. Shortly thereafter, a bubo appears in the groin, axilla, or cervical region,
characterized by a swollen, erythematous, tender lymph node, 1 to 10 cm in diameter which
can develop into a necrotic ulcer.12 A minority (13%) will develop sepsis with no bubo,
a form of plague termed primary septicemic plague; leading to disseminated intravascular
coagulation resulting in gangrene of acral regions such as the digits and nose (Fig 3).13 If
left untreated, the case fatality rate for bubonic plague is 50%.14
Treatment guidelines
The recommended antibiotic for plague is parenteral streptomycin with gentamicin and
doxycycline as possible alternatives. Supportive therapy includes anticoagulation and ﬂuid
resuscitation.Respiratoryisolationisimportantforhealthcareworkerstopreventsecondary
pneumonic plague. Buboes should not be drained because they almost always recede with
antibiotic therapy and incising them may cause hematogenous spread. The recommended
approachisaspirationofthepalpablelymphnodes,whichisbothdiagnosticandtherapeutic,
providing symptomatic relief.12,13
Viral hemorrhagic fever
Historically, VHF agents, such as Arenaviridae (Lassa fever), Bunyaviridae (hemorrhagic
fever with renal syndrome), Filoviridae (Ebola), and Flaviviridae (Yellow Fever and
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Dengue), were considered too dangerous to use as warfare weapons because they are
highly contagious and unstable, putting the handler at risk for self-infection. To date, no
record of VHF weaponization exists.15
Humans, while not a natural reservoir, may become infected through contact with
infected animal reservoirs or arthropod vectors. Human-to-human transmission occurs
through close contact with infected people or their bodily ﬂuids. These viruses target the
vascular bed, inducing microvascular damage and thrombocytopenic hemorrhage. Patients
present acutely febrile with prostration, myalgias, fatigue, petechiae and in severe cases,
frank bleeding from internal organs and mucous membranes leading to hypotension and
shock. Viral hemorrhagic fever (particularly Ebola) mortality from multisystem failure is
substantial, ranging from 50% to 90% within one week of exposure.11
Treatment guidelines
Treatment is largely supportive. Ribavirin has shown limited efﬁcacy in individuals with
Lassafeverorhemorrhagicfeverwithrenalsyndrome.14 Localwoundcaremaybeindicated
for management of sequelae of microvascular damage as described earlier. Hemorrhage
between fascial sheaths can sometimes precipitate an acute compartment syndrome, par-
ticularly in the forearm requiring surgical decompression.16
Tularemia
Tularemia is caused by an aerobic, gram-negative coccobacillus, Francisella tularensis,
which occurs naturally in many parts of the United States as infected rodents and ticks
harbor the pathogen. Humans can become infected via insect bites, contact with infected
animal carcasses,and consumptionof contaminatedfood (Fig 4). Despite difﬁculthandling
and an unstable spore form, if tularemia were to be used as a bioweapon, the most likely
method would be through aerosol spread.11
Once inoculated into the skin, mucous membranes, gastrointestinal tract, or lungs of a
humanhost,thesebacillimultiplyintracellularlyandspreadtoregionallymphnodes,where
they disseminate throughout the body. Symptoms usually appear 5 days after exposure with
a prodromal phase, a focal and intensely suppurative necrosis of the tissue which develops
into granulomas (similar to patterns seen in tuberculosis and sarcoidosis).16 Patients with
primary inhalational exposure can develop hemorrhagic inﬂammation of the airways, pro-
gressing to bronchopneumonia which may easily be confused with Legionnaires’ disease
or inhalational anthrax, so it is important to differentiate between them.11 Without prompt
treatment, the tularemia is fatal in 80% of victims.
Treatment guidelines
Earlyantibiotictreatmentwithparenteralstreptomycinorgentamicincaneffectivelycontrol
infection progression. In a mass casualty setting, oral treatment with doxycycline (14-21
daysregimen)orciproﬂoxacin(10days)ispreferredforthosewhoareexposed.Precaution-
ary isolation is not necessary as tularemia is not spread via person-to-person transmission.
Skin infections presenting with a “heaped-up” ulcer may require surgical intervention,
keeping in mind that incision and drainage of lymphadenopathy is contraindicated due to
the risk of hematogenous spread and secondary pneumonic tularemia.16
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Figure 4. This Vermont muskrat trapper contracted tularemia, which mani-
fested as cutaneous lesions on the dorsum of his right hand. Source: Public
Health Images Library (PHIL) id# 6466. Dr. Roger A. Feldman.
Botulism
BotulismisaparalyticneuromusculardisordercausedbythetoxinofbacteriumClostridium
botulinum, a gram-positive, spore forming, obligate anaerobe ubiquitous to soil and ma-
rine environments. There are 3 types of naturally occurring botulism—foodborne, wound,
infantile—and a fourth man-made form, inhalational botulism. All forms of the disease
result from the absorption of toxins into the circulation from a mucosal surface, usually
intestines, lungs, and occasionally a wound. The toxin binds and irreversibly blocks the
peripheral cholinergic synapses at neuromuscular junctions throughout the body causing
global muscle paralysis necessitating mechanical ventilation. Botulinum toxin poses a ma-
jor bioweapon threat because it is the most acutely toxic substance known with a median
lethal dose as low as 1 ng/kg (IV). After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq admitted to having
produced 19,000 liters of concentrated toxin, which is approximately 3 times the amount
needed to kill the entire current human population through inhalation.17 Aerosolized dis-
semination of the toxin is the most likely means of biowarfare, but given the difﬁculty of
stabilizing the agent, terrorists may prefer contaminating food products.
All forms of botulism ultimately manifest into a classic triad: (a) symmetric, de-
scending ﬂaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies (with diplopia, ptosis, dysarthria,
dysphonia, and dysphagia), (b) afebrile patient with (c) clear sensorium. Infants with
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botulism present with lethargy, poor feeding, poor muscle tone, and a weak cry (Fig 5). The
neurologic symptoms from foodborne botulism, the most common form, may be preceded
by abdominal cramps, vomiting, or diarrhea.18 Rapidity of onset and severity of botulism
depend on the rate and amount of toxin absorption19 and the route of administration.
Figure 5. Six-week-old infant with botulism, which is evident
as a marked loss of muscle tone, especially in the region of the
head and neck. Source: Public Health Images Library (PHIL) id#
1935.
Treatment guidelines
Treatment consists of supportive care and immunization with equine antitoxin. Respiratory
failure secondary to paralysis can persist for weeks to months, requiring extended mechan-
ical ventilation and intravenous ﬂuid resuscitation. If diagnosed early, administration of a
passive neutralizing antibody can minimize subsequent nerve damage and severity, which
will prevent symptom progression. If wound botulism is suspected, wide debridement to
removethesourceofthetoxin-producingbacteriaisindicated.Becauseofearlyrecognition
and improved care, the mortality rate amongst botulism patients has fallen from about 50%
to 8% over the past 50 years.
DISCUSSION
As demonstrated by the anthrax letters and the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack,
biologicalterrorismisarealandpresentthreat.Thehighlypotent“ClassA”agentsdiscussed
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earlier can inﬂict serious illnesses on thousands of victims in a relatively short period
of time. Even a small-scale attack can create an enormous psychological impact when
the medical community is ambushed with an unfamiliar threat, and unpreparedness can
certainly result in chaos. In 2001, for example, the anthrax attacks prompted the CDC,
local public health agencies, and community physicians to confront an array of scientiﬁc
uncertainties. They had limited experience in dealing with B. anthracis disease, and CDC
ofﬁcials reported at the time: “We lacked scientiﬁc data to address issues. We could not
inform public health decision making regarding issues such as exposure, isolated cases,
letters in transit, and cross-contamination.”4 The usual systematic, step-by-step approach
of the CDC for investigating disease outbreaks was simply not feasible in the context of a
high-proﬁle multifocal attack that potentially placed thousands at risk. Furthermore, most
local health practitioners had never seen a single case of inhalational anthrax. They were
on the “front lines” without the experience, guidance, or support to contain the threat and
effectively treat the victims.
This episode also served as a tremendous impetus to bolster bioterrorism education
amongst the medical community. Because this issue globally involves all disciplines, it is
equally important that plastic surgeons be primed with treatment guidelines if consulted in
theeventofafutureattack.Inouropinionbasedonourexperienceatalargeurbanhospital,
most plastic surgeons have little, if any, experience with “Class A” infectious agents. At a
minimum, we should be familiar with the basic presentation of these bioterrorism agents.
Because these attacks tend to affect a large number of victims simultaneously, the medical
community is likely to be overwhelmed and require the assistance of physicians such as
plasticsurgeonswhomaynototherwisebethoughtofasprimaryresponderstomostofthese
disease entities. Furthermore, when a large number of patients present with manifestations
of disease caused by biological agents, they may occupy a large number of patient beds
in the emergency departments, and hospitals where the attack has occurred. The ability
to correctly identify these manifestations at an early stage is the only way physicians
can manage and treat these patients. Unless these cases are correctly identiﬁed, these
patients may occupy beds in the emergency department indeﬁnitely and compromise care
for patients with other acute illnesses that require rapid workup. On the contrary, patients
who are dismissed from the emergency department with an incorrect diagnosis may spread
the disease throughout the community or even die from the disease. The ﬁrst challenge this
article addresses is providing the information to discern index cases rapidly and correctly.
As described earlier, patients subjected to bioterrorist agents can present with neurologic
symptoms(eg,botulism),respiratorysymptoms(eg,plaguepneumonia,inhalationanthrax,
tularemic pneumonia), gastrointestinal illnesses, or hemolytic (eg, African hemorrhagic
fevers) symptoms. In addition, it establishes basic guidelines for surgical management
options in regard to each pathogen, because many present with soft tissue and osseous
manifestations.
CONCLUSION
A brief glance at peer-reviewed resources indicates that many other ﬁelds have already
starteda processof addressingpreparednessfor bioterrorismintheirmedicalcommunities.
A pilot assessment survey to determine the current level of preparedness is underway.
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This article represents a ﬁrst step in developing evidence-based consensus guidelines and
recommendations for the management of biological terrorism for plastic surgeons.
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